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  5 
ABSTRACT  6 
Tornadoes represent a unique natural hazard  because of the very low probability of  7 
occurrence, short warning times (on the order of only a few minutes), and the intense and  8 
destructive forces imposed on engineered and non-engineered buildings.  The very low- 9 
probability very high-consequence nature of a tornado strike makes designing for  10 
survival and reducing damage under typical financial constraints a substantial challenge.   11 
On April 27, 2011 an EF4 tornado devastated a 0.8 km (1/2 mile) wide path almost 10  12 
km (5.9 miles) long through the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama continuing on the ground  13 
for 130 km (80 miles).  This paper presents the design concept that resulted following a  14 
week-long data reconnaissance  deployment  throughout the city of Tuscaloosa by the  15 
authors.  The dual-objective philosophy proposed herein is intended to focus on both  16 
building damage and loss reduction in low to moderate tornado windspeeds and building  17 
occupant  life safety in  more damaging wind speed events  such as EF4 and EF5  18 
tornadoes.  The philosophy articulates a design methodology that is the basis upon which  19 
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structural engineering was formed, namely provide life safety and control damage, but  20 
focused at separate tornado intensity levels.   21 
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  24 
INTRODUCTION  25 
Tornadoes, like all natural hazards, possess a full range of intensities from Enhanced  26 
Fujita (EF) 0 that removes shingles from houses to EF5 that causes total destruction.   27 
Currently in structural engineering light-frame design, tornado forces are not considered  28 
because of their very low probability of occurrence.  This is the case even though the  29 
consequences of a tornado strike are severe, usually resulting in a range of damage and  30 
often fatalities. Structural engineering research studies related to tornadoes over the last  31 
four decades has consisted of studies on tornado dynamics (e.g. Davies-Jones, 1986; Lee  32 
and Wurman, 2005), wind pressure distributions (e.g. Lewellen et al, 1980; Kosiba et al,  33 
2008; Kosiba and Wurman, 2010; and Karstens et al, 2010), and missile risk analysis  34 
(e.g. Dunn and Twisdale, 1979; Twisdale et al, 1979).  Some early studies also focused  35 
on Forensics and design of structures to tornadoes (e.g. Minor et al, 1972; 1976;  36 
McDonald et al, 1974) as well as damage prediction for buildings in tornadoes (e.g.  37 
Mehta et al, 1981; Minor et al, 1978).  Studies that utilized damage to buildings in the  38 
path of a tornado to develop wind speed maps and/or assessments have also been  39 
performed (e.g. Coulbourne, 1999; 2008; Prevatt et al, 2011).  A substantial amount of  40 
tornado  research has been done in the field of meteorology on the occurrence and  41 
formation of tornadoes (e.g. Forbes, 2006) but is not expanded on here.   42   3 
  43 
Recently,  Haan et al (2010) used the tornado generator at Iowa State University to  44 
compute pressure coefficients on a small-scale model of a one-story rectangular building.   45 
They determined that the side (transverse) wind pressures on the building in simulated  46 
tornadoes were 1.8 to 3.2 times those of a straight line wind, e.g. hurricane, with the same  47 
wind velocity.  Components and cladding tornado-induced pressures are between 1.4 and  48 
2.4 times that of a straight line wind with the same velocity, mainly due to the vertical  49 
suction imposed by low pressure within a tornado (these values will be used to compare  50 
failure probabilities for a basic rectangular building later in this paper). These unique  51 
characteristics, together with the localized extremely high wind speed over 200 mph,  52 
have historically made the design of building structures against tornadoes difficult to  53 
rationalize. In this study, it is proposed based on a recent damage survey of the 2011  54 
Tuscaloosa Tornado that the design against tornado hazard should be based on dual level  55 
limit states, namely damage control for low wind speeds and life safety for high wind  56 
speeds.  57 
  58 
BACKGROUND  59 
April 27
th, 2011 saw one of the largest outbreaks of severe weather in US history with 53  60 
confirmed tornados in Alabama (NOAA, 2011).  The supercell that spawned the  61 
Tuscaloosa tornado traveled over 480 km (300 miles)  through four states, while the  62 
tornado itself was on the ground for approximately 130 km (80 miles), starting north of  63 
Union, Alabama and traveling north-east to Fultondale, Alabama.  The path cut across  64 
Tuscaloosa County and the study area is as shown on the locator maps in Figure 1.  The  65   4 
City of Tuscaloosa was in the direct path and was bisected in a south-west to north-east  66 
direction as shown in Figure 2.  The 0.8 km (1/2 mile) wide by 10 km (5.9 mile) long  67 
buffer around the center of the tornado path became the study area.    68 
  69 
The City of Tuscaloosa has a population of approximately 93,000.  This southeastern  70 
university town is primarily made up of single-story, single-family homes and light  71 
commercial structures.  The tornado’s path cut through neighborhoods consisting of off- 72 
campus student housing, single-family homes, two-  and three-story wood-frame  73 
apartment buildings, and light commercial buildings.  The majority of neighborhoods that  74 
were in the path of the tornado were post-World War II construction dating from the  75 
1950s to the 1970s.  Intermingled in these neighborhoods are newer homes and some  76 
newer multi-story, wood-frame apartment buildings.  77 
  78 
Over 7,000 homes in Tuscaloosa County received some level of damage as a result of the  79 
tornado.  Of those 7,000 homes, approximately 4,700 homes were destroyed or received  80 
major damage.  Ninety-five percent of the destroyed or damaged housing units were  81 
single-family homes (Morton, 2011).    82 
  83 
FIELD INVESTIGATION  84 
In the days following the Tuscaloosa tornado, a team of researchers from academia and  85 
industry assembled in Tuscaloosa to collect perishable data associated primarily with  86 
wood-framed structures.  Field data collection activities were conducted from May 2  87 
through May 5, 2011. Approximately 0.8 km (1/2 mile) long transects across the path of  88   5 
the tornado, spaced approximately 0.8 km (1/2 mile) apart, were studied and building  89 
damage ranging from no-damage to total destruction was recorded in the form of geo- 90 
referenced photographs and detailed case studies.    91 
  92 
Data collection activities began each day by synchronizing cameras and video equipment  93 
with Global Positioning System (GPS) units.  Transects across the tornado path were then  94 
investigated throughout the day.  Each evening the  photos and GPS tracks were  95 
downloaded from field equipment and processed to create a nightly progress map.  A  96 
custom software program developed at The University of Alabama automatically created  97 
a Geographic Information System (GIS) ready file of photo locations from the daily GPS  98 
tracks and photo times.  The photo locations were then displayed as points and overlaid  99 
on a basemap of Tuscaloosa and the photos were hyperlinked to their locations.  100 
Individual building damage was rated on an  EF  scale  based on photo evidence  and  101 
specific buildings were identified for detailed case study investigations.  102 
  103 
A map showing EF categories for buildings is shown in Figure 3 and available on the  104 
web at http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/tuscaloosa_tornado/.  The degree of damage observed  105 
and documented in Tuscaloosa ranged from no building damage to damage associated  106 
with EF4 level wind speeds.  As expected, it can be seen from Figure 3 that higher EF  107 
wind speeds (reds) tend to be located along the center line of the tornado, while lower EF  108 
wind speeds (greens) tend to be along the edges of the tornado path.  A contour map of  109 
the EF wind speeds developed from observed building damage is shown in Figure 4.  As  110 
expected, the contours in Figure 4 show that the majority of buildings in Tuscaloosa  111   6 
received no building damage.  The area of each EF wind speed (in acres) is shown in the  112 
legend in Figure 4.  It was observed that the vast majority (86%) of the affected area was  113 
at the EF2 category or lower (wind speeds below 135 mph).  114 
  115 
DUAL DESIGN PHILOSOPHY   116 
In this paper, a dual objective-based tornado engineering design philosophy is explained  117 
that has the simultaneous objectives of (1) reducing monetary losses due to damage (D);  118 
and (2) reducing loss of human life (L).  While these objectives may seem an obvious  119 
goal for any design code related to natural hazards, an acceptable solution for light-frame  120 
buildings has not been put into practice by the design community. Consider that at the  121 
center of a tornado swath for a large EF4 or EF5 tornado there is substantial damage,  122 
potentially  slabs swept clean of the residential building that once stood there,  123 
corresponding to a degree of damage (DOD) of level 10.  Moving out perpendicular to  124 
the direction of travel of the tornado the DOD reduces at some gradient to a DOD of level  125 
1, which is the threshold of visible damage (WSEC, 2006).  It should be noted that the  126 
DOD’s are not intended to be mutually exclusive nor absolute, i.e. they  can overlap  127 
significantly.  128 
  129 
There are two considerations or design objectives for a new tornado design philosophy:  130 
damage (D) and life safety (L).  This dual design approach can be achieved using three  131 
philosophies, as shown in Table 1 and explained here: (1) Damage can be controlled at  132 
lower levels of the Enhanced Fujita scale wind speeds, i.e. EF0 and EF1, through the use  133 
of engineered connectors, design ensuring continuous vertical uplift load paths,  134   7 
horizontal load distribution and load paths, as well as better shingles and reinforced  135 
garage doors.  This is handled typically at the component (C)  design level, i.e.  136 
connectors, single load paths.  (2) For wind speeds currently corresponding to EF2 and  137 
EF3, both component  and system-level loading must be considered to enable better  138 
performance.  System level (S) performance is related to load sharing amongst wall lines  139 
and distribution of the lateral load path as a whole throughout the building as a structure  140 
is racked by wind and amplified further by windborne debris.  (3) In tornadoes with wind  141 
speeds currently corresponding to EF4 and EF5, the major issue becomes system effects  142 
and other alternatives (A)  to provide life safety to the building occupants.  These  143 
alternatives are safe rooms, underground shelters, and often basements, most of which  144 
assumes total devastation of the main structure.  Table 1 presents the concept of design  145 
objectives and the philosophy aligning with each of the two objectives.  It is important to  146 
note that the dual objectives must be used simultaneously in building design, and  147 
therefore so should the three philosophies that drive the design toward the objectives.   148 
This will ensure minimization of financial losses when possible and protection of life  149 
safety for building occupants in the worst case.  No effort was made in this paper to  150 
identify what wind speeds can be reasonably (i.e. financially viable) designed for in  151 
practice beyond conceptual discussion.  152 
  153 
DESIGN OBJECTIVES  154 
Consider the first of the dual objectives described above, namely reducing monetary  155 
losses from tornadoes.  Engineering design can reduce and in many instances eliminate  156 
the damage as described in Table 2.  Each of the examples in Table 2 is linked to one of  157   8 
the two proposed design objectives and best addressed using either: 1) a component level  158 
(C) design philosophy, 2) a system level (S) design philosophy, or 3) an alternative (A)  159 
philosophy.  Specifically, an engineering solution typically focuses at either the  160 
component level such as a connection or single wall, or at the system such as the lateral  161 
force resistance for a building.  Additionally, as one can see from inspection of Table 2,  162 
an alternative approach for life safety must be considered at the high EF3 to EF5 wind  163 
speeds.  Since there is obviously no way of knowing where in the swath of a large  164 
tornado the design building will be located, the three philosophies are applied at the same  165 
time to achieve the dual objectives.  166 
  167 
A survey on the performance of existing residential structures in the 2011 Tuscaloosa  168 
tornado indicated a lack of continuous load path consistent with older construction  169 
practices and conventional  construction.  It is envisioned that by employing the dual- 170 
objective design philosophy, a portion of the damage that occurred due to EF2 and below  171 
wind speeds will be reduced thus resulting in a “shift” of building performance from  172 
current observation. There is a wind speed limit for which engineers rationally conclude  173 
the alternative philosophy will be a more practical solution and monetary losses are  174 
unavoidable for economically viable housing. A reduction in damage can be realized for  175 
many buildings that have historically suffered significant damage at the outer edges of  176 
large tornadoes or in smaller tornadoes. Consequently, the implementation of this dual- 177 
objective approach will result in a reduction of the width of extensive damage along the  178 
tornado path. Although the center of large tornados will still experience EF4 or EF5 level  179 
damage, there would be a steeper gradient in damage reduction to EF1 or below after  180   9 
moving outside the high wind speed region.  In other words, an explicitly articulated  181 
dual-objective design philosophy  will reduce the losses for wind speeds below some  182 
threshold while providing life safety at wind speeds exceeding that threshold.  Figure 5  183 
shows on the left a hypothetical tornado damage swath path and the performance of  184 
current  residential buildings and on the right the improved swath  due to the  185 
implementation of the dual-objective design achieved by applying all three philosophies,  186 
namely component, system, and alternative.  187 
  188 
In the following section, selected photos from the Tuscaloosa tornado damage assessment  189 
are presented to illustrate several critical damage states outlined in Table 2. As illustrative  190 
examples, design and construction features that may help to shift the damage to a lower  191 
degree are discussed for each case and linked to the three design philosophies described  192 
earlier, as well as the potential level of difficulty in addressing these problems with  193 
engineering design.  The potential level of difficulty  in implementation is provided  194 
because one of the most significant challenges in residential construction is altering  195 
convention even when it may provide a performance improvement.  196 
DOD2: Loss of roof covering: Loss of roof covering may be due to aging of roofing  197 
material or improper fastener schedule. With high wind-rated roof shingles and correct  198 
installation details, damage shown in Figure 6a could be reduced or eliminated.  The  199 
potential difficulty of implementing this component level change is low.  200 
DOD2: Loss of vinyl/metal siding:  Siding materials are often torn off by strong wind due  201 
to geometry and improper installation details.  An example of observed siding damage is  202 
shown in Figure 6b.  The space between the siding and sheathing behind it often makes  203   10 
siding one of the first components to be damaged in strong wind, particularly siding on  204 
roof gables.  Hurricane  rated siding installed with fastener penetration into studs and  205 
sheathing material, can significantly increase the capacity of siding.  The potential  206 
difficulty of implementing this component level change is medium.  207 
DOD3: Broken glass in doors and windows: The damage to door glass and windows,  208 
examples of which are shown in Figure 7, is difficult to design against due to the high  209 
debris content  within a tornado. There is no economical  way to strengthen the  glass  210 
components of  a  building envelope to prevent missile intrusion, however, the  use of  211 
storm shutters may reduce windborne debris penetration for lower wind speeds, but likely  212 
not for wind speeds in excess of 140 mph.  The potential difficulty of implementing this  213 
component level change is high.  214 
DOD4: Uplift of roof deck and loss of significant roof covering material:  Roof coverings  215 
are typically not designed for significant internal pressure.  High internal building  216 
pressure is common in high wind due to breaches  in a windward wall  as a result of  217 
window breakage, and the same phenomenon is assumed to occur in a tornado.  218 
Significant roof damage can occur as shown in Figure 8a. Specifying a design limit state  219 
in which internal pressure is considered, and ensuring a continuous vertical load path, are  220 
mitigation strategies.  The potential difficulty of implementing this component/system  221 
level change is medium.  222 
DOD4: Garage door blown inward:  Garage doors are a very commonly observed weak  223 
link in residential building envelopes, as shown in Figure 8b.  Once a garage door fails,  224 
further breaching of the main portion of the house can occur because attached garages are  225 
often frame back into the main house. With proper detail in bracing design and use of  226   11 
wind-rated garage door systems, garage door failure can be mitigated.  The potential  227 
difficulty of implementing this component level change is low.  228 
DOD4: Failure of porch or carport:  A porch or carport  is often an  under designed  229 
extension  of  the roof system  that  creates a weak link at the  interface with the main  230 
structure, i.e. where the porch or carport frames back into the main roof system.  Poles  231 
supporting porches  and carports are  often inadequately connected to the foundation  232 
allowing for uplift and failure as seen in Figure 8c.  Once these weak interfaces are  233 
designed properly, extended roofs for porches and carports will withstand wind speeds  234 
beyond 90 mph, perhaps even as high as 140 to 150 mph.  The potential difficulty of  235 
implementing this component level change is low.  236 
DOD4: Collapse of chimney:  With proper lateral load design,  the performance of  237 
chimneys in tornadoes can be significantly improved. Brick chimneys in old construction  238 
are typically stacked bricks or unreinforced masonry and are susceptible to collapse in  239 
tornado force winds as shown in Figure 8d.  Designing for lateral loads on chimneys can  240 
be addressed relatively easily in new construction.  Making chimneys part of a strong  241 
“core” for an entire wood frame building is also suggested.  The potential difficulty of  242 
implementing this component level change is medium.  243 
DOD5: House shifts off foundation:  Significant wind speeds are required  to shift an  244 
entire building off a foundation, even if the building is poorly anchored to the foundation.   245 
An  observed example of a building shifting off a foundation is shown in Figure 9.    246 
Although engineering design can address the foundation slippage relatively easily, the  247 
level of lateral force may just damage the other structural components if the foundation  248 
holds. The design of the  foundation  and anchors  must be done in coordination with  249   12 
structural lateral force resisting systems similar to earthquake systems.  The potential  250 
difficulty of implementing this system level change is medium.  251 
DOD6: Large sections of roof structure removed:  Failure of the majority of the roof  252 
structure, examples of which are shown in Figure 10, may be mitigated through the use of  253 
connection hardware and non-conventional member sizes for roof trusses. This may be a  254 
good practice for custom designed  or  specific  buildings.    The potential difficulty of  255 
implementing this system level change is medium.  256 
DOD7: Exterior walls collapsed: A safe room or shelter is the best means of protecting  257 
the lives of the occupants in the event of wind speeds in excess of 160 mph (e.g. DOD7- 258 
DOD10). The majority of exterior walls of a wood framed structure will collapse in wind  259 
with speeds in excess of 160 mph.  An observed example of a building where the exterior  260 
walls collapsed is shown in Figure 11.    The potential difficulty of implementing this  261 
system level and alternative method change is high.  262 
DOD8: Most walls collapsed: An observed example of a building where most of the  263 
walls collapsed is shown in Figure 12.    264 
DOD10: Slab swept clean:An example of an entire building blown away, leaving only the  265 
slab, is shown in Figure 13.  The building in Figure 13 was a  newly constructed  266 
apartment complex built in 2010.  Note that even the linoleum on the floor was pealed up  267 
from the tornado.    268 
  269 
From the discussion on DOD levels observed during the Tuscaloosa investigation it is  270 
clear that there are design measures one can take to reduce or eliminate certain levels of  271 
tornado damage on the outside edge of a tornado path. It is believed by the authors that a  272   13 
residential building at the center of a strong tornado cannot be designed economically to  273 
withstand tornado loads.  The authors strongly believe that this does not justify ignoring  274 
the engineering measures that can be taken to reduce tornado damage for regions under  275 
certain threshold level, e.g. 135 mph, which is the vast majority of the tornado affected  276 
region, according to the survey results from the Tuscaloosa tornado.  277 
  278 
ILLUSTRATIVE FRAGILITIES  279 
In order to illustrate the potential effectiveness of one retrofit or mitigation technique that  280 
is commonly used in hurricane prone regions of the U.S., fragilities for two simple  281 
scenarios are developed.  The first compares two different roof nail patterns where one is  282 
representative of standard coastal construction and one represents poor construction in  283 
which some field nails were missed underscoring the need for quality.  The second  284 
compares the failure probability of a single and dual hurricane clip in both a hurricane  285 
and a tornado to typical toe-nailing.   The house used in this example is intended solely  286 
for illustration and included four basic rooms. The plan and dimensions of the house are  287 
shown in Figure 14. The house roof is sheathed with 1.22m x 2.44m (4ft×8ft) oriented  288 
strand board (OSB) with a thickness of 12mm (15/32 inches). The roof-sheathing panels  289 
are attached to two truss members by 8d-box nails (6cm [2.375 in]) long, 0.287cm [0.113  290 
in]  in diameter). Two roof-sheathing nail patterns were investigated in this example  291 
within the context of tornado and hurricane winds: 15cm/30cm (6”/12”) (6 inches  292 
between edge nails and 12 inches between field nails) and 15cm/61cm (6”/24”). The  293 
latter of these is used here to represent poorer construction where not all roof sheathing  294   14 
nails hit the truss.  Roof trusses are placed at 60 cm (24 inches) on center and connected  295 
to the walls by H2.5 hurricane clips.  296 
In order to compare the probability of failure for roof-sheathing panels or roof-to-wall  297 
connections (hurricane clip) between a hurricane and a tornado, a fragility analysis was  298 
conducted in this example. In general, the failure probabilitycan be defined through the  299 
expression of the following limit state function:  300 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] ∑ = = < = <
y
y D P y D X G P X G P . 0 0       (1)  301 
where D is the random variable representing the demand on the system (e.g., 3-sec gust  302 
wind speed) and  [ ] y D P =  is the natural hazard probability,  ( ) [ ] y D X G P = < 0  is the  303 
conditional limit state probability, and denotes the so-called fragility (Ellingwood et al,  304 
2004).  305 
The limit state describing roof panel uplift failure involves wind load and dead load and  306 
is expressed as (Ellingwood et al., 2004):  307 
( ) ( ) D W R D W R G − − = , ,         (2)  308 
where R is the resistance of the roof panel or hurricane clip to uplift (Table 3), W is the  309 
uplift wind load and D is the dead load on the panel. The wind load applied on low-rise  310 
building components and cladding can be computed as:  311 
[ ] pi p h GC GC q W − =           (3)  312   15 
where  qh  is velocity pressure evaluated at mean roof height, G  is gust factor, Cp  is  313 
external pressure coefficient and Cpi is internal pressure coefficient. Equation (3) is used  314 
to calculate the wind load induced by hurricane wind.  In order to approximate tornado  315 
wind, the total pressure coefficient is scaled by a factor H to account for the increase in  316 
vertical wind velocity pressure:  317 
[ ] pi p h GC GC H q W − =        (4)  318 
In this example, the factor H is treated as a random variable and its density function is  319 
assumed to be uniformly distributed over a range [1.4, 2.4] for components and cladding  320 
and [1.8, 3.2] for the main uplift wind resisting system based on the work by Haan et al,  321 
(2010).  It should be noted that the pressure coefficient on the components and cladding  322 
is still larger than the main wind force resisting system even when the factor H is applied.   323 
The velocity pressure is calculated following ASCE-7 (2010) as:  324 
2 . . . 00256 . 0 V K K K q d zt h h =         (5)  325 
where Kh is the exposure factor, Kzt is the topographic factor (taken equal to unity so as  326 
not to make the results dependent on local topography surrounding the building); and Kd  327 
is the directional factor (it is assumed that the wind direction is known and Kd is set to  328 
unity); and V is basic wind speed. R, D, GCp, GCpi, and Kh  are taken as random variables  329 
in reliability analysis. The mean value of GCp was evaluated by wind tunnel tests (Datin  330 
and Prevatt 2009). Statistics of random variables for wind load and dead load are  331 
presented in Table 4.  It is observed from the wind tunnel test data that the largest wind  332 
pressure coefficient occurs on the roof at panel B (Figure 15) with wind direction  333   16 
o
wind 45 = α  (Cp = 2.3). For wind direction 
o
wind 0 = α , the largest wind pressure coefficient  334 
is at the panel A (Cp = 1.47).  335 
Figure 15 shows the fragility curves of the two panels with different nail patterns under  336 
the wind load induced by hurricane wind and the approximate tornado wind loading. It  337 
can be seen from Figure 15 that the lowest risk of failure is for panel A, nail pattern  338 
15cm/30cm (6”/12”) under the hurricane wind (the far-end curve on the right). If this  339 
panel is subjected to the approximated tornado wind, the fragility shifts to the left and is  340 
indicated by the large bold curve. Comparing these two curves, one can see that panel A  341 
with nail pattern 15cm/30cm (6”/12”) almost has zero probability of failure at hurricane  342 
wind V = 224 kph (140 mph), but this panel has a probability of failure of 30% if it is  343 
under a tornado wind with the same wind velocity. The worst case is panel B with a nail  344 
pattern of 15cm/61cm (6”/24”) under tornado wind, whose fragility curve is represented  345 
by the curve on the far-left end. One can see that this panel has less than 10% failure  346 
probability  under hurricane wind velocity 150 kph (93 mph), but 63% probability of  347 
failure if the house is subjected to a tornado with the same wind velocity (approximately  348 
an EF1 tornado wind speed).  349 
A fragility analysis was also used to illustrate the failure of the roof-to-wall connection.  350 
This roof-to-wall connection  is close to the location where the largest wind pressure  351 
occurs and is shown in the inset images in Figure 16a and 16b. The wind direction used  352 
in the calculation is 45
o,which is the same as the wind direction that induces  the  353 
maximum wind pressure on the roof. Again, the fragility curves for a single hurricane  354 
clip, double clip, and toe nailing under the wind load from a hurricane is shown in Figure  355   17 
16a.  Note that toe nails have a 67% probability of failing at 160 kph (100 mph) but that  356 
simply  replacing them with  a single H2.5 hurricane clip virtually  eliminates  the  357 
likelihood of failure.  In a tornado, recall from the earlier discussion that the uplift and  358 
other pressures are higher than a straight line wind and thus the amplification factor was  359 
modeled as a uniformly distributed random variable based on the range given by Haan et  360 
al (2010).  Although this is approximate and clearly additional work is needed, it is  361 
applied here to help introduce the additional uncertainty associated with tornado wind  362 
loading into the resulting fragilities.  It can be seen that if the roof truss is connected to  363 
the wall with a H2.5 hurricane clip, the probability of failure for the hurricane clip is  364 
about 49% to 89% if loaded by an EF2 tornado (expected wind speed range of 111 – 135  365 
mph).  If two H2.5 hurricane clips are used, and assuming the wood truss can develop the  366 
full force in the connectors, there is only approximately a 2% to 18% failure probability  367 
in an EF2 tornado.  This illustrates the damage reduction possibility for a single damage  368 
mechanism through the use of hardware. Finally, it should be noted that in the tornado  369 
pressure calculations the building was assumed to have been breached whereas the  370 
envelope was assumed to remain intact in the hurricane pressure analysis.  371 
FUTURE STEPS FOR RESIDENTIAL LIGHT-FRAME CONSTRUCTION  372 
The low probability of tornado occurrence combined with the high consequences of a  373 
tornado strike make for a very challenging load scenario to consider in structural design.  374 
Unlike straight line winds, it is difficult to attach a specific probability to tornado wind  375 
speed at a specific building site because of the low occurrence rate. There are also studies  376 
(e.g. Haan et al, 2010) that show tornado loading has a significantly stronger vertical  377 
component than straight line winds, even when the horizontal wind speeds are the same,  378   18 
as illustrated in the fragility assessment presented earlier.  Several critical issues need to  379 
be addressed before the structural engineering community can develop and implement a  380 
dual-objective design philosophy for tornado hazard mitigation of residential buildings.  381 
Some of the most important issues include:  382 
  383 
Issue 1: Identify realistic threshold wind speeds that a light-frame wood building can  384 
resist. A systematic study needs to be conducted that focuses on the optimal threshold  385 
tornado wind speed for which engineers should be designing a system. This requires a  386 
thorough survey of possible improvements and design options that are practical and the  387 
corresponding wind speed at which these measures will be valid.  A study should also be  388 
conducted on the cost-benefit ratio of these design options at various wind speeds to  389 
inform the calibration of the new dual-objective tornado design philosophy. This  390 
threshold is highly dependent on the structure type and acceptable probability of failure.  391 
For economically viable residential buildings it is likely to be in the 120~150 mph range.    392 
  393 
Issue 2: Develop a better understanding of the spatial characteristics of tornado loading.  394 
The current understanding of tornado loading on structures is not comprehensive or even  395 
comparable to that for straight winds because of the high level of turbulence and debris in  396 
a tornado. This is partially due to the lack of experimental procedures to accurately  397 
represent tornado loading. Unlike widely adopted scaled wind tunnel testing for wind  398 
loading on structures and components, the spatial characteristics of the loading on  399 
buildings within a tornado path are  very difficult to experimentally investigate.   In  400 
addition, how the lateral wind pressure combined with suction acts on  different  401   19 
components of a structure is unknown, although some work has been performed in this  402 
area.    Applying design methods from straight wind cases will likely improve the  403 
resistance of buildings against tornadoes;  designing using realistic and quantifiable  404 
tornado loading is most desirable. Studies on tornado loadings should be focused on  405 
scaled experimental work, numerical simulation, and  continued  in-situ tornado data  406 
collection.    407 
  408 
Issue 3:  Acceptable and implementable approaches  in design and construction  of  409 
residential buildings to reduce tornado damage.  A suite of design and retrofit measures  410 
should be developed to reduce structural and component damage up to the threshold wind  411 
speed. The measures for design and retrofit can be very different and may take many  412 
forms including adjustment factors for loading, prescriptive requirements, innovative  413 
analysis procedures, and additional load cases (such as the breached garage door case for  414 
attached garage wall and roof design). Available products on the market for residential  415 
construction  must back measures that can be implemented by the current residential  416 
construction industry, possibly with minimal training. Implementing hurricane region  417 
construction practices and products in tornado prone regions is a good starting point, but  418 
not necessarily an end solution.   419 
  420 
Issue 4: Shelters or safe rooms for extreme wind speeds.  For wind speeds exceeding the  421 
design  threshold, the alternative of a shelter or safe room can provide life safety to  422 
building occupants.  The shelter must be designed to handle both wind pressure and  423 
debris impact as in the current guidelines (FEMA 320 and FEMA 361) to build safe  424   20 
rooms and shelters.  These can be built per FEMA recommendation and their increased  425 
use should be further enabled in more for tornado prone regions.  Shelters should be  426 
included at the same time as the component and system philosophies are implemented as  427 
discussed above.   428 
  429 
Summary and Recommendations  430 
Tornados are very low-probability but very high-consequence natural  hazard  events  431 
which makes designing for survival and mitigating damage under typical financial  432 
constraints a substantial challenge.  However, a dual objective-based design philosophy  433 
for  residential buildings can reduce damage and save lives by focusing on separate  434 
tornado intensity levels.  The performance of buildings: (1) at EF0 and EF1 wind speeds  435 
can be improved at the component level (i.e., connections), (2) at the EF2 and EF3 wind  436 
speed design can be improved at the system level (e.g., shear walls, load paths), and (3) at  437 
EF4 and EF5 wind speedlife safety can be provided using alternate means (e.g., safe  438 
rooms).  The Tuscaloosa, Alabama tornado of 2011 was used as an example throughout  439 
this paper to systematically explain the concept.  However, several critical issues have to  440 
be addressed before this dual-objective design philosophy for tornado hazard mitigation  441 
can be realized, e.g., identification of  realistic threshold wind speeds,  better  442 
understanding of the spatial characteristics of tornado loading,  acceptable and  443 
implementable approaches  in design and construction to reduce tornado damage, and  444 
implementation of shelters or safe rooms for extreme wind speeds.    445 
  446 
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Table 1: Design Objectives and Philosophy Considered as a Function of Wind Speed  559 
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  563 
Table 2: Dual design objectives, philosophy, and examples of Engineering/ Construction  564 
Improvements  565 

























1  Threshold of visible 
damage 
N/A 
2  Loss of roof 
covering 
Use manufacturer recommended 
number and placement of fasteners for 
high wind shingles. 
2  Loss of vinyl/metal 
siding 
Use high wind-rated siding and ensure 
fastener penetration into studs (not 
board of any kind). 
3  Broken glass in 
doors and windows 
Use hurricane rated windows and 
doors.  This is not necessarily effective 
against windborne debris impact, but 
minimizes loss of building envelope. 
4  Uplift of roof deck 
and loss of 
significant roof 
covering material 
Use hurricane clips on both sides of 
truss, 2x6 trusses, heavier nail 
schedule on roof sheathing, add 
blocking for short edge nailing of roof 
sheathing. 
4  Collapse of 
chimney 
Better connection to the structure. 
4  Garage door blown 
inward 





4  Failure of porch or 
carport 
Ensure continuous vertical load path 
through engineered metal connectors 
from roof into foundation. 
5  House shifts off 
foundation 
Ensure adequate number and 
placement of anchor bolts, use steel 




6  Large sections of 
roof structure 
removed 
Ensure connection between 
trusses/rafters to wall top plates.  
Space trusses at 16” oc and line them 




7  Exterior walls 
collapsed 
Closer nail schedule for shear capacity, 
provide full anchorage for all walls; 
safe room or shelter. 
 
Alternative 
8  Most walls 
collapsed 
Safe room or shelter. 
9  All walls collapsed  Safe room or shelter. 
10  Slab swept clean  Safe room or shelter. 
1A recommendation for an Enhanced Fujita Scale (2006), Wind Science and Engineering Center, Texas  567 
Tech University, Lubbock, Texas.  568 
569   28 
  570 
  571 
  572 
  573 
Table 3: Capacity statistics  574 
Variables  Mean  (COV)  Distribution 
Roof sheathing panel (15cm/30cm or 6”/12”) 
Roof sheathing panel (15cm/61cm or 6”/24”) 
Hurricane clip H2.5 
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  578 
  579 
  580 
Table 4: Wind load and dead load statistics  581 
  582 
Variables  Mean  Coefficient of 
variation (COV)  Distribution 
Dead Load D 
Kh (exposure B) 
GCp (C&C) 
GCpi 
1.6 psf (0.077 kPa) 
1 
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Figure 1, Locator map of Tuscaloosa County and the Study Area showing the path of theApril 
27
th Tuscaloosa tornado. 
 
 Figure 2, Downtown Tuscaloosa showing the tornado path and study area in relation to major 
roads, water, and The University of Alabama. 
 
Figure 3 Map showing EF rated photos along the tornado path in Tuscaloosa. 
 
Figure 4 Contour map of EF wind speeds based on observed building damage 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual tornado damage swath based on current performance (left) and after the 
implementation of the dual-objective design that reduces lower wind speed damage (right).  
 
Figure 6: Examples of observed Level 2 Degree of Damage (a) loss of shingles, (b) loss of 
siding. 
 
Figure 7: Example of observed Level 3 Degree of Damage, broken windows. 
 
Figure 8: Examples of observed Level 4 Degree of Damage, (a) significant roof damage, (b) 
garage door blown in, (c) porch damage, and (d) chimney collapse. 
 Figure 9: Example of observed Level 5 Degree of Damage, building shifted off of the 
foundation. 
 
Figure 10: Example of observed Level 6 Degree of Damage, large sections of roof removed. 
 
Figure 11: Example of observed Level 7 Degree of Damage, exterior walls collapsed. 
 
Figure 12: Example of observed Level 8 Degree of Damage, most walls collapsed. 
 
Figure 13: Example of observed Level 10 Degree of Damage, newly constructed (2010) 
apartment complex with slab swept clean. 
 
Figure 14: Plan of the house used in the example 
 
Figure 15: Fragilities for loss of roof sheathing panels 
 
Figure 16:Fragilities for roof to wall connection failure in a (a) hurricane and (b) tornado 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 